15.11.5 85a (שמא יגרשנה) → 86b (משנה ד׳)

- I משנה ד' a wife banning others from benefiting from her
 - a if she bans other relatives (her own father/brother, husband's father/brother) he cannot reject
 - b if she bans husband
 - i ת"ק: no need to reject (her wages belong to him)
 - ii אי cnucle cnucle cnucle cnucle cnucle (עי׳ כתובות ה:ע׳ cnucle cnucle cnucle cnucle) אי כתובות וו אי cnucle cnucle (עי׳ כתובות אי cnucle cn
 - iii ייי אופן בן נורי: suggested that he reject in case he divorces her (then he won't be able to remarry her)
 - 1 ריב"נ follows הלכה ישמואל
 - (a) Challenge: שמואל doesn't maintain that אדם מקדיש דבר שלא בא לעולם
 - (i) *Explanation*: ריב"נ"s ruling seems predicated on the notion that her ban is effective for future circumstances which don't currently hold e.g. her independent financial status
 - (ii) Support for question: שמואל rules that if a man dedicates as הקדש his wife's future earnings:
 1. הקדש the surplus is הקדש
 - 2. ר' יוחנן הסנדלר surplus is also שמואל rules in accord with חולין בינדלר. ר' יוחנן הסנדלר
 - (b) Suggested resolution: perhaps שמואל only meant (in re our הלכה) that הלכה follows ריב"נ re: surplus
 (i) Explanation: רי"ע , contra י"ר , holds that the surplus belongs to the husband and is inviolate
 - (ii) Rejection: wording of שמואל's ruling doesn't fit
 - (c) *Resolution #1(יוסף*): קונמות (vows) are unique:
 - (i) *Explication*: since a man may ban another's property on himself, he may also ban preexistent property
 - 1. *challenge (אבי*): A's ability to ban a B's property on A is parallel to A's ability to ban A's property on B; how can he ban pre-existent property on B when he can't ban B's property on B?
 - (d) resolution #2 (ר׳ הונא בריה דר׳ יהושע): if she "dedicates her hands to their Maker"
 - (i) challenge: but her "hands" (their product) are משועבד to the husband
 - 1. possible defense: where she says: "as of when I am divorced"
 - 2. block: but she isn't currently divorced→it reverts to דבר שלא בא לעולם
 - a. *challenge*: if a man sells a field and states to the buyer: after I buy it back, it is הקדש that is valid
 - i. *block*: disanalogous he currently owns the field, but she is currently married and not financially independent
 - b. *rather*: if a man is about to buy a field and states that when he buys it the field will become הקדש it isn't valid (hence her declaration should also be invalid)
 - i. *block*: disanalogous the field is currently owned by another; she, however, isn't owned by her husband
 - c. *rather*: if a man gives his field as a pledge and states that when he redeems it, it is שקדש that's valid
 - i. *block*: disanalogous the field is his to redeem at any point; she doesn't have the power to make herself independent (i.e. divorce)
 - d. *rather*: if a man gives his field as a pledge for a set period and declares that when he redeemds it the field will be הקדש it's valid
 - *block*: disanalogous regarding the field, there is a set time after which it will be in his power to redeem, unlike the woman
 - (e) *resolution #3 (רב אשי*): (similar to קונמות (ר' יוסף are unique in that they are akin to קדושת הגוף
 - (i) *premise*: איסור הקדש (along with איסור חמץ and liberation of slaves) remove the constraints of שעבוד
 - (ii) *challenge*: if so, why does ריב"ג need to mention the concern lest he divorce her?
 - (iii) Answer: it is an additional consideration

i.